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Abstract: The confirmation bias, unlike other decision biases, has been shown both empirically and
in theory to be enhanced with deliberation. This suggests that limited attention, reduced deliberation,
or limited available cognitive resources may moderate this bias. We aimed to test this hypothesis using
a validated confirmation bias task in conjunction with a protocol that randomly assigned individuals
to one week of at-home sleep restriction (SR) or well-rested (WR) sleep levels. We also used a
measure of cognitive reflection as an additional proxy for deliberation in our analysis. We tested
the hypotheses that the confirmation bias would be stronger for WR participants and those higher
in cognitive reflection on a sample of 197 young adults. Our results replicated previous findings,
and both males and females separately displayed the confirmation bias. Regarding our deliberation
hypotheses, the confirmation bias results were most precisely estimated for those having thought
relatively more about the issue of gun control. Additionally, for the subset of individuals having
thought relatively more about gun control, we found evidence that the confirmation bias was stronger
for those higher in cognitive reflection and, somewhat less robustly, for those participants who were
(objectively) well-rested.
Keywords: confirmation bias; sleep; deliberation; cognitive reflection
1. Introduction
The confirmation bias has been well documented in the political domain [1–7]. Political polarization
is a timely topic, and this paper examines the hypothesis that deliberation promotes the confirmation bias.
Cognitive dissonance theory [8] suggests it is rational to engage in selective information exposure
to reduce cognitive dissonance [9–11]. Dissonance may also be reduced by discounting the value of
arguments opposed to one’s viewpoints. It is likely difficult to address and resolve the confirmation bias,
and this study adds to our understanding of this behavioral phenomenon by examining how one’s
thinking style or cognitive state may play a key role in its development.
Recent neuroscience findings [12,13] suggest the confirmation bias may result from the anticipation
of cognitive dissonance [11] and a desire to avoid regret (Nicolle et al., [14]). This would imply that
the bias results from thoughtfulness rather than the lack of thought. Theory has also described
the confirmation bias as resulting from deliberative reasoning [15]. Recent evidence supporting
this viewpoint was reported in Knobloch-Westerwick et al. [4], who found that cognitive reflection
heightened the political confirmation bias. Another study found that higher cognitive reflection and
increased thought put into an issue predicted a stronger confirmation bias in both the political and
religious domains, but one’s self-reported sleepiness did not significantly affect the bias [16]. Overall,
these previous findings suggest that limited attention, thought, or reflection on an issue may lead to
less confirmation bias if one considers a framework where deliberation is what promotes this bias.
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This paper first contributes to the literature by replicating classic confirmation bias findings [6]
extended to include an examination of gender differences in this bias. We also replicate recent
confirmation bias results showing that deliberation or cognitive reflection promotes the bias [4,16].
Secondly, we further the literature by testing a novel extension of this deliberation hypothesis by using
a state of sufficient sleep (i.e., well-rested) as a proxy for deliberation—in this case, sleep restriction
would then proxy for limited attention or limited deliberation. Dickinson [16] used self-reported
sleepiness as one of several proxies for deliberation in evaluating the confirmation bias, but such
a measure was inherently weak given participants were allowed to self-regulate their sleep levels
with no experimental intervention. Here, we address this concern by drawing from participants
in a larger study who were randomly assigned a sleep level for one week. Insufficient sleep is
highly relevant in modern society—approximately one-third of adults in many countries have been
found to suffer from insufficient sleep [17]—and so there is a naturally occurring heterogeneity
in sleep states in the population. While some people may voluntarily subscribe to insufficient
sleep levels in the real world, many are in such a state by constraint (e.g., young children in the
household, shift-work scheduling). In the present study, the confirmation bias task was administered
to participants involved in a separate 1 week sleep study who had been randomly assigned to a
sleep restricted (SR: 5–6 h/night attempted sleep) or well-rested (WR: 8–9 h/night attempted sleep)
treatment. The ecologically valid sleep protocol took place in one’s home environment using objective
and validated sleep-tracking instrumentation, and the experimental (random) assignment of sleep
levels helps us more confidently assess any causal link between insufficient sleep and the confirmation
bias compared to a purely observational study.
The sleep study offered the unique opportunity to examine how a commonly experienced cognitive
state may impact susceptibility to the confirmation bias. Specifically, we hypothesized that individuals
in a randomly assigned WR state, who we assume should have additional cognitive resources available
for deliberation, will display an enhanced confirmation bias relative to SR participants. Similar to
Knobloch-Westerwick et al. [4], we also hypothesized that those higher in cognitive reflection will
display a larger confirmation bias, although our task tested this on a distinct outcome measure.
In other words, a goal of the present paper is to extend the boundaries of recent research that shows
cognitive reflection enhances the confirmation bias, rather than mitigates it. Additionally, because sleep
restriction is known to promote decision making consistent with reduced deliberation1, this implies
that being in a well-rested state may be hypothesized to actually promote a greater confirmation bias.
2. Methods
Participants in our study were recruited from those enrolled in a larger research study on sleep
and decision making. Other tasks administered to the participants were strategic noncooperative
tasks that were independent from the survey administered for this paper, and these other tasks were
administered in person during a lab visit at the end of the study. As noted below, participants in the
larger research study were given the opportunity to participate in this independent online survey
study for additional compensation. The fact that we only offered this confirmation bias task survey
study to those in the larger sleep-and-decision study implied we would have objective sleep data on
our participants that resulted from a validated random assignment sleep restriction methodology.
The sleep methodology used for the larger study is described in more detail elsewhere [19], but we
summarize the methods here. Participants were recruited from a database of individuals at a public
university who completed a short online screening survey. This survey elicited basic demographic
1 See Dickinson and McElroy [18] on this point and for a comparison of alternative frameworks. The conclusion is that a
reasonable theoretical framework would consider that sleep restriction increases the relative cost of deliberative reasoning
inputs in one’s decision making “production function”, which points to a reduced use of deliberation in such instances.
Such a formal framework is consistent with the empirical evidence that generally finds decision making when sleepy as
consistent with reduced deliberation and increased use of heuristics or automatic decision processes.
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information as well as basic sleep and mood disorder information on potential participants that were
used as screening criteria for “sleep and decision making” studies, in general. Exclusion criteria for
this study were: self-reported sleep disorder, at risk of major depressive or anxiety disorder, older than
39 years of age (young adult age range approved was 18–39 years old individuals), and no extreme
diurnal preferences (i.e., no extreme morning-type or evening-type participants).2 Participants meeting
the inclusion criteria were recruited to take part in a study involving a 1-week sleep manipulation
prior to decision-making. Viable participants were randomly assigned to a sleep-restricted (SR: 5–6 h
per night) or well-rested (WR: 8–9 h per night) condition, which took place in the participant’s home
environment. Recruitment emails then specified the randomly assigned sleep condition, and no
switching of sleep condition was allowed. The larger sleep study required participants to submit sleep
diaries and have sleep tracked using research-grade actigraphy devices. Sleep data were scored using
accepted protocols (e.g., [23]) such that we had valid data on sleep levels from each participant in
the study.
For the present confirmation bias study, an email was sent after the 5th (of 7) night of the sleep-week
protocol inviting participation in an additional compensated online study. Participants had roughly
48 h in which to complete the online survey (prior to the end of the main study). This implies that all
those represented in our sample for this study had undergone at least 5 nights of the prescribed sleep
levels for the larger main study, and this was considered sufficient to treat the participant in the sleep
condition.3 As this additional study was optional and recruited participants may also fail to complete
the sleep protocol, we address potential selection bias in the Results section.4
The survey administered to our confirmation bias study sample first elicited information on
political preferences, attitudes, and ideology. Across the entire survey, the participant would only
advance after completing each question or task and was not allowed to go back to any previous survey
page. The key independent measure used to assess the confirmation bias was one’s response on a
5-point scale of self-reported political ideology we called the Liberal Score (1 = Very Conservative,
5 = Very Liberal). Taber and Lodge [6] classified individuals as Democrat or Republicans, but our survey
elicited political party classifications to include “Independent” and “other”, along with “Democrat”
and “Republican”. As such, we adopted a 5-point scale as a general continuous political ideology
measure for our analysis. In our sample, Democrat participants had a significantly higher scores
compared to non-Democrat participants (i.e., Conservatives, Independents, or “other”) on the Liberal
Score measure (Mann–Whitney test of medians: z = 8.537, p < 0.001). This is what one would expect,
and this supports the validity of the Liberal Score metric.
The political issue we used to assess the confirmation bias was “gun control”, following Taber
and Lodge [6] (see Appendix B), which contained two components. The “information exposure”
component of the task required viewing 6 arguments on gun control, where one could choose the
argument’s source (2 liberal and 2 conservative source options were used, as in Taber and Lodge [6]
such that it was possible to view arguments entirely from one-side, the other side, or on both sides of
the issue of gun control. Specifically, for each of the 6 arguments, one could select to see an argument
whose source was either the Republican Party, the National Rifle Association, the Democratic Party,
or the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence (and the task instructions made clear that the first
2 sources were against gun control while the second 2 were in favor of gun control). After the first
argument source choice was made, an argument (clip) was displayed to the participant on a new
2 Risk of major depressive disorder was contained in the database responses to the PHQ-2 instrument (Kroenke et al. [20]),
anxiety risk was assessed using the GAD-7 (Spitzer et al. [21]), and diurnal preferences were assessed using a validated
short-form morningness–eveningness instrument (Adan and Almiral [22]).
3 Other studies have used anywhere from 1 to 5 nights of sleep restriction and reported similar levels of self-reported sleepiness
(Åkerstedt and Gillberg, [24]) post-treatment (see discussion in Dickinson et al. [25]).
4 All subjects gave their informed consent for inclusion before they participated in the study, which was not required as a
condition of continuance in the main sleep study. This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki,
and the protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of Appalachian State University (IRB approval number 17-0177).
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survey page from the library of 6 arguments from that source (see Appendix B for the full library of
arguments from each source). After viewing the clip, a new page asked the participant from which
of the same set of sources he/she would like to view the second argument. This process continued
until 6 separate arguments had been viewed from self-selected sources. The next (distinct) “argument
assessment” component of the confirmation bias task presented all participants with 3 pro-gun-control
and 3 pro-gun-rights arguments, each on separate survey pages, and on the page of each argument we
elicited the individual’s perception of how strong/weak the argument was.
Regarding the deliberation hypothesis, we elicited how much thought the individual had put
into the issue of gun control on a 0–100 scale, and we also administered a validated 6-point cognitive
reflection task (CRT) [26] as a proxy for deliberation. The individual’s randomly assigned sleep
treatment, SR = 0 or 1, served as a final proxy measure for deliberation. See Appendix B for
complete survey and variable construction details. Additional measures used as control variables in
the analysis included demographics, one’s morningness–eveningness measure [22], one’s daytime
chronic sleepiness score [27], as well as baseline measures of prosociality and backwards induction
generated as baseline measures in the main sleep study.5 Table 1 shows summary statistics on our
sample of n = 197 participants. Female participants (n = 121) were significantly more liberal on
our 1–5 scale than male participants (Liberal Score of 3.50 compared to 2.92, 2-sample t-test p < 0.01),
and minority participants (n = 47) were marginally more liberal than nonminority participants
(Liberal Score of 3.49 compared to 3.21, 2-sample t-test p = 0.08). Overall, the sample was well balanced
on observable characteristics across randomly assigned sleep treatments (see Figure A1), and the sleep
protocol was valid—SR assignment reduced objective sleep levels (Mann–Whitney test: p < 0.001),
increased subjective sleepiness (Mann–Whitney test: p < 0.001), and reduced self-reported attentiveness
(Mann–Whitney test: p < 0.001).
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean(Std Dev) Notes
Female (=1) 0.614 (0.488) n = 121 females, n = 76 males
Minority (=1) 0.239 (0.427) n = 47 minority, n = 150 nonminority
Age (in years) 19.822 (2.900) ≥40 years of age excluded from study
Parent Income category 7.995 (3.108) 8 = USD 75,000 total household income
Mother’s Education Level 8.178 (2.014) 8 = Associate degree
Epworth daytime sleepiness score 8.173 (3.487) ≥10 indicate significant daytime sleepiness
Prosocial (=1) 0.767 (0.424) Based on Social Value Orientation (n = 193)
Race Game Score [0, 10] 4.253 (2.215) Backwards induction measure (n = 194)
6-item Cognitive Reflection Task score 2.273 (1.691) (n = 194)
Liberal Score (1–5) 3.274 (0.967)
Notes: observations = 197 unless otherwise specified (lower in a few instances due to missing responses on some
instruments).
As part of our sensitivity analysis we also explicitly addressed the potential selection concern
in our sample by first conducting a Probit estimation of the likelihood of inclusion in our sample,
conditional on recruitment into the main study (see Table A1 for results from the selection equation).
The estimated selection equation shows that, using the measured characteristics we had available on
participants in the larger sleep study, only daytime sleepiness (Epworth) predicted a higher likelihood of
selecting into our sample (i.e., choosing to participant in the confirmation bias online study). We then
calculated the predicted likelihood of completing the online confirmation bias study, as a function of
the observable demographic, sleep, and mood disorder measures we had (see Table A1). Using these
5 The indicator for Pro-Social = 1 individuals was based on the Social Value Orientation measure in Murphy et al. [28],
Race Wins (out of 10 games) was a measure of backwards induction ability assessed using performance in a series of 10 Race
Game tasks played against a computer opponent (Gneezy et al. [29]).
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predicted probabilities, we then constructed the inverse probability weights (IPW) and used these to
perform weighted least squares analysis (our IPW-corrected analysis) in all our tests of Hypotheses
1 and 2.6 While this does not address the need to eventually extend this research to a more broad
representation of the population, this approach does address the concern for selection bias into this
confirmation task data set among those who were enrolled in the larger sleep study. Compensation for
this study was a fixed USD 5 Amazon gift code and was separate from compensation for completing
the sleep protocol.7
3. Hypotheses
As discussed in the Methods section, our task replicates the Taber and Lodge [6] decision
environment used to study the confirmation bias in those with a politically liberal versus conservative
ideology. The issue we used as the subject of our task environment was “gun control”.8 The two-part
task allows us to evaluate one’s choice to expose oneself to politically dissonant (or consonant)
arguments, as well as whether perceptions of arguments from the opposing ideology are viewed
as weaker. These are articulated in our Hypothesis 1 below. The second hypothesis is with respect
to the deliberation hypothesis, which we evaluate using a standard measure of cognitive reflection
as well as one’s sleep state to proxy for deliberation. This deliberation hypothesis derives from the
aforementioned studies that suggest theoretical frameworks whereby reason patterns of thought can
produce the bias [15], as well as recent empirical studies showing evidence that some form of increased
thought or reflection enhances the bias [4,16].
Hypothesis 1. Those with more liberal political ideology will expose themselves to fewer conservative ideology
statements, and view conservative arguments as being weaker.
Hypothesis 2. Deliberation will enhance the confirmation bias. Deliberation will be assessed using a measure
of cognitive reflection as well as one’s randomly assigned sleep state.
We share below the confirmation bias task results estimated from both the full sample as well
as the subsample of those deemed to have been compliant with their assigned sleep condition
(SR sleep ≤ 375 min/night, WR sleep ≥ 405 min/night)—not every participant’s objectively measured
nightly sleep fell within the designated levels for SR or WR. This approach has been used previously to
distinguish between participants who may or may not have put much effort into complying with their
prescribed sleep assignment (e.g, [19]). Inherently, there is some subjectivity to the boundaries of any
such compliance cutoff points, and so for this reason we also conducted and report estimation results
on the full “intent-to-treat” sample of participants.
4. Results
Our main focus is on testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. We also present results from our confirmation
bias replication analysis by gender. As the key independent variable used to test both Hypotheses 1 and
2 is our Liberal Score measure, we will note here some additional evidence that helps further document its
validity as a continuous measure of political ideology. Specifically, we examined the relationship between
Liberal Score, gun rights preferences, and other partisan preferences. Partisan preferences were elicited
6 All results are similar if we ignore the selection issue altogether (available on request).
7 Variable compensation for this task was not used given that argument assessments were subjective, and there was no right
or wrong number of pro-gun control information clips to view. A separate task not related to this paper was included within
the survey and allowed participants to add up to another USD 3.75 (for a total of USD 8.75) to their Amazon gift code
compensation for the survey. Fixed compensation for completing the sleep protocol was USD 30 paid by check after the
conclusion of the study.
8 Taber and Lodge [6] examined both gun control and affirmative action in their study. The key feature is that the issue chosen
for the task represents a rather partisan issue at the time.
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via “thermometer ratings” (0–100 scale) of individuals and groups (see Appendix B). A thermometer
rating of 100 shows “warm” feelings or high favorability regarding that individual/group, while a
rating of 0 indicates the most “cold” or unfavorable rating. Preference ratings of recent high-profile
U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and Republican President Donald Trump show
the expected patterns: a higher Liberal Score measure predicted significantly higher favorability ratings
for Hillary Clinton and liberals, in general, and it predicted lower favorability ratings for Donald
Trump and conservatives, in general (see Figure A2). More liberal participants also had significantly
higher favorability ratings of homosexuals, Muslims, illegal immigrants, and people on welfare. This is
true whether or not the analysis includes demographic controls or sample restriction based on sleep
compliance (Figure A2). Regarding the specific issue of gun control, our survey used the Taber
and Lodge [6] elicitation of a gun rights “extremity of position” measure by eliciting 9-point Likert
scale responses indicating one’s strength of agreement on a series of six gun rights (or gun-control)
statements. We centered each response scale at 0 and reverse-scored the anti-gun rights statement
responses to create a singular Pro-Gun-Rights position measure, which ranged from −24 to +24.
We show in Table A2 that a higher Liberal Score predicts a lower Pro-Gun-Rights position measure
across several estimation alternatives. In short, we proceed with our main analysis with confidence
that our key independent variable measure of political ideology is valid.9
To test our confirmation bias replication hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), we first examined the
impact of the Liberal Score measure on the number of pro-gun rights information clips viewed (0–6),
# PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS, and the perceived strength of pro-gun rights arguments. We constructed
the variable PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH from the Taber and Lodge [6] set of
gun-control and gun-rights arguments to which participant were asked to assess the strength of
each argument on a 9-point Likert scale. We centered each response, reverse scored the items
whose arguments favored gun control and the result was a composite score that ranged from −24
to +24 and reflected one’s overall perception of the strength of the arguments favoring gun rights
(i.e., negative values reflect on overall anti-gun-rights perception of argument strength).10 Thus,
the dependent variable used to assess the information exposure dimension of the confirmation bias
was # PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS, and the dependent variable used to examine the perceived argument
strength dimension of the confirmation bias was PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH.
4.1. Hypothesis 1 Tests—The Confirmation Bias (Pooled and by Gender)
We estimated models to test both dimensions of the confirmation bias across several specifications.
In all cases, we estimated weighted regressions using the inverse probability weights (IPW) correction
to address potential sample selection, and the main Hypothesis 1 tests were also examined by gender.
The full estimation details are given in Tables 2 and 3 (pooled across genders) and in Tables 4 and 5
(results separated by gender subsample). To help visualize the key findings across several specifications,
Figure 1 presents the coefficient plots of the estimated impact of Liberal Score on each key outcome
measure. The various specifications represent our sensitivity analysis of the key result and, given how we
defined both confirmation bias outcome measures, negative estimates on the Liberal Score variable across
all models in Tables 2–5 support Hypothesis 1.11 As is succinctly shown in Figure 1, the estimates show
consistent evidence in support of the confirmation bias in both the information exposure (upper panels,
Figure 1) and perceived argument strength (lower panels, Figure 1) dimensions. This both replicates
9 Details on the questions and construction of this measure on shown in Appendix B (the “Extremity of Position” set
of questions).
10 While the construction of the composite metric follows a similar approach, note that PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT
STRENGTH differs from the Pro-Gun-Rights position measure in that the latter was constructed from a distinct set of
arguments (for and against gun control) to which the respondent was asked to indicate his/her level of agreement, not the
strength or weakness of the argument itself.
11 That is, a negative coefficient estimate indicates the higher one’s Liberal Score, the fewer Pro-Gun-Rights Clips viewed and the
weaker the PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH.
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and extends previous findings given our results also document the confirmation bias separately in
both male and female participants. Figure 1 also highlights that the estimated effect becomes less
consistent when estimated on the subset of male participants indicating they had put relatively less
thought into the issue of gun control.12 In fact, regarding information exposure, our estimates even
suggest that male participants who thought relatively little about the gun control issue were willing to
sample information clips from sources that did not align with their ideology (model 4, Table 4). As the
sample size becomes quite small with those who have thought less about gun control (see number of
observations listed in the figure legend), we conducted our main Hypothesis 2 tests on the subset of
individuals who already expressed having thought/deliberated a lot about gun control.
 









-1 0 1 1.5-0.5 0.5 -1 0 1 1.5-0.5 0.5 -1 0 1 1.5-0.5 0.5
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All Data Males only Females only
All Data Males only Females only
Simple (M121, F176) Simple + compliant (M65, F111)
Controls (M75, F118) Controls + compliant (M64, F108)
Controls+compliant+HIGH thought (M40, F62) Controls+compliant+LOW thought (M24, F47)
Confirmation Bias (by gender)
Figure 1. Impact of Liberal Score on # PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS viewed (upper panels) and on
perceived strength of pro-gun-rights arguments (lower panels). Notes: All models account for sample
selection using the inverse probability weight (IPW) correction—see Table A1 for selection equation
estimates. One or more control measures were not captured on 4 individuals. Models conditioned
on sleep compliance do not include well-rested (WR) participants with < 405 min nightly sleep
(actigraphy measured) or sleep-restricted (SR) participants with > 375 min nightly sleep (and also
excludes participants who failed the attention check question). HIGH Thought refers to those responding
≥ 65 on a [0, 100] scale of how much thought they had put into the issue of gun control. Thin (thick)
lines represent the 95% (90%) confidence intervals. See Tables 2–5 for full results of all models other than
binary regressions for the separate male and female subsample models (where the only independent
variable was Liberal Score and whose coefficient estimate is shown above).
12 Dickinson [16] documented a significantly stronger confirmation bias in both the political and religious domains for those
participants indicating they had thought relatively more about these issues (using the same Thought Much measure as
was in our survey). As an alternative, we estimated several of our main specifications that correspond to Figure 1 results
by including the continuous variable Thought Much as a regressor, which necessitates the inclusion of a Thought Much
* Liberal Score interaction term as all. These results are shown in the Appendix A, Figure A4, and they also highlight that the
strongest impact of High Thought on the gun control issue in our confirmation bias finding is regarding PRO-GUN-RIGHTS
ARGUMENT STRENGTH (especially for males). To avoid the need later for triple interaction terms to pursue this approach
in examining Hypothesis 2, we conduct the analysis here using the High Thought subsample of the data where the estimated
effects are most clear.
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IPW-correct Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 197 176 193 172 102 71
R-squared 0.091 0.093 0.163 0.172 0.257 0.243
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for the 1-tailed test for the confirmation bias hypothesis tests of the Liberal Score coefficient estimate given our ex ante hypothesis of a confirmation
bias via selective information exposure. Asterisks show results from 2-tailed tests for all other regressors. --- indicates covariates omitted for that specification. All models take selection
into account by using the inverse probability weights from the selection equation estimates given in Table A1. High Thought refers to those who reported have thought relatively a lot
about the specific issue of gun control (Thought Much ≥ 65 on scale of 0–10).
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IPW- correct Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 197 176 193 172 102 71
R-squared 0.288 0.253 0.348 0.362 0.467 0.159
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for the 1-tailed test for the confirmation bias hypothesis tests of the Liberal Score coefficient estimate given our ex ante hypothesis of a confirmation
bias via perceptions regarding argument credibility. Asterisks show results from 2-tailed tests for all other regressors. --- indicates covariates omitted for that specification. All models take
selection into account by using the inverse probability weights from the selection equation estimates given in Table A1. High Thought refers to those who reported have thought relatively
a lot about the specific issue of gun control (Thought Much ≥ 65 on scale of 0–100).
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Table 4. Impact of Liberal Score on # PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS viewed—males vs females.


















































































































































































IPW-correct Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 75 64 40 24 118 108 62 47
R-squared 0.237 0.286 0.474 0.525 0.197 0.187 0.212 0.447
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for the 1-tailed test for the confirmation bias hypothesis tests of the Liberal Score coefficient estimate given our ex ante hypothesis of a confirmation
bias via selective information exposure. Asterisks show results from 2-tailed tests for all other regressors. All models take selection into account by using the inverse probability weights
from the selection equation estimates given in Table A1. High Thought refers to those who reported have thought relatively a lot about the specific issue of gun control (Thought Much ≥ 65
on scale of 0–10).
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Table 5. Impact of Liberal Score on PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH—males vs females.


















































































































































































IPW-correct Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 75 64 40 24 118 108 62 47
R-squared 0.418 0.397 0.532 0.091 0.224 0.237 0.384 0.258
Notes: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for the 1-tailed test for the confirmation bias hypothesis tests of the Liberal Score coefficient estimate given our ex ante hypothesis of a confirmation bias via
selective information exposure. Asterisks show results from 2-tailed tests for all other regressors. All models take selection into account by using the inverse probability weights from the
selection equation estimates given in Table A1. High Thought refers to those who reported have thought relatively a lot about the specific issue of gun control (Thought Much ≥ 65 on scale
of 0–100).
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A Note on Response Times
As Taber and Lodge [6] also found evidence that participants may spent additional time reading
arguments contrary to their political ideology, we collected response time (RT) data within our survey.
Here, we have RT data on both the time spent reading the information clips selected for the information
exposure component of the confirmation bias task, as well as on the time spent assessing each argument
of the perceived argument strength dimension of the task. The presentation of information clips
and arguments (with argument strength assessment scale) on individual survey pages allowed for a
relatively clean collection of these data.
We failed to find support for any significant impact of political ideology on the RT data along
either dimension of the task. A series of regressions were estimated to assess the impact of Liberal Score
on RT in both the pooled data, and also in the gender-specific subsamples. These results are shown
as coefficient plots in the Figure A3, but there is no evidence of systematic RT effects of ideology in
our data. The assessment of RT data in a sample of participants who varied by randomly assigned
sleep state may, however, present unique challenges to the extent that RT data may be particularly
noisy among sleep restricted participants (e.g., see discussion in Dickinson and McElroy [18]).
4.2. Hypothesis 2 Tests—The Impact of Deliberation
In testing Hypothesis 2, we extended the previous model specifications to include either a
Liberal Score * CRT or Liberal Score * SR interaction term. The estimation results are shown in Tables 6 and 7.
We did not assess Hypothesis 2 separately by gender given the reduced power in an already small
sample to identify an interaction effect compared to a main effect, although future research may find it
useful to pursue potential gender differences in the confirmation bias at a deeper level.
Our findings in Table 6 show some support for Hypothesis 2 regarding selective information
exposure, although we failed to support Hypothesis 2 with respect to perceived argument strength
(Table 7).13 To the extent that our data showed some evidence supporting Hypothesis 2, the finding is
still somewhat sensitive to our model specification. Focusing on the models with a more complete
set of control variables (models 3–4 and 7–8 of Table 6) seems reasonable. Here, our findings are more
robust regarding the impact of cognitive reflection (CRT score) on amplifying the confirmation bias
(i.e., the negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the Liberal Score * CRT interaction term).
As the CRT was assessed in an online survey, there may be some concern that participants searched
for correct answers on the internet and thus compromised the validity of the CRT as a measure of
deliberation in our study. While this was possible, the summary statistics in Table 1 highlight that,
on average, participants did not even answer half of questions from the 6-item task correctly (78% got 3
or fewer correct out of 6 total items). As such, we do not have reason to question the CRT validity in
our data set.
13 That is, the confirmation bias regarding perceived argument strength (Table 7) was equally strong across CRT scores and
randomly assigned sleep levels.
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Table 6. Impact Liberal Score and interactions on # PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS viewed.
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Race Wins --- --- −0.121(0.041) ***
−0.094





IPW-correct Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 104 115 102 113 102 113 102 113
R-squared 0.160 0.121 0.286 0.222 0.139 0.123 0.292 0.242
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for the 2-tailed test. --- indicates covariates omitted for that specification. Models estimated on the subsample of individuals having Thought
Much ≥ 65 on scale of 0–100. Key coefficient estimates on Liberal Score and its interactions Liberal Score * SR and Liberal Score * CRT can be assessed using 1-tailed test given our ex
ante hypothesis that deliberation promotes the confirmation bias. Key main and interaction effect estimations in shaded cells. A specification that includes both interaction effects
maintains the same sign on the main effects of SR and CRT, as well as the same sign on interaction effects of these variables with Liberal Score, but statistical precision is not robust as
power is reduced. In such a specification, which of the SR or CRT effects are precisely estimated (i.e., statistically significant) depends on the specification (i.e., controls or not, compliant
participants or intent-to-treat). Female and Minority are indicator variables. Epworth and rMEQ are the Epworth daytime sleepiness score and reduced morningness-eveningness diurnal
preference score, respectively, of the individual from the prescreen survey (i.e., trait level measured at point in time prior to this study). Pro-Social is an indicator variable derived from the
social value orientation measure, and Race Wins measures the individual’s score on a backwards induction measure (the “race game”). The sample size is reduced by 2 observations in
some specifications due to two participants for which the CRT measure is missing.
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Table 7. Impact of Liberal Score and interactions on PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH.
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rMEQ --- --- −0.49(0.22) **
−0.39



















IPW-correct Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 104 115 102 113 102 113 102 113
R-squared 0.380 0.408 0.467 0.480 0.390 0.423 0.467 0.480
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for the 2-tailed test. --- indicates covariates omitted for that specification. Models estimated on the subsample of individuals having Thought
Much ≥ 65 on scale of 0–100. Key coefficient estimates on Liberal Score and its interactions Liberal Score * SR and Liberal Score * CRT can be assessed using 1-tailed test given our ex ante
hypothesis that deliberation promotes the confirmation bias. Key main and interaction effect estimations in shaded cells. Female and Minority are indicator variables. Epworth and rMEQ
are the Epworth daytime sleepiness score and reduced morningness-eveningness diurnal preference score, respectively, of the individual from the prescreen survey (i.e., trait level measured
at point in time prior to this study). Pro-Social is an indicator variable derived from the social value orientation measure, and Race Wins measures the individual’s score on a backwards
induction measure (the “race game”). The sample size is reduced by 2 observations in some specifications due to two participants for which the CRT measure is missing.
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Regarding the impact of SR as a novel measure of deliberation, there is weaker evidence in
model (3) of Table 6 suggesting SR may mitigate the confirmation bias to some extent (i.e., the positive
and marginally significant coefficient estimate on the Liberal Score * SR interaction term). The same
finding is not present in Table 6 model (4), but recall that model 4 also includes participants who did not
comply well with the prescribed sleep parameters of the larger study. The key Hypothesis 2 findings
from the specifications with demographic controls for the sleep-compliant sample of participants
(Table 6 models (3) and (7)) are also graphically depicted in Figure 2 (see Table 6).14 Here, the top panel
of Figure 2 shows the predicted confirmation bias effect increase for WR compared to SR participants
(i.e., steeper slope in the forecast line for WR participants). The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the
estimated effect that those with higher CRT scores displayed a stronger confirmation bias in terms of
selective information exposure.
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14 Across all specifications in Table 6, the deliberation interaction term effects are consistently in the direction of the Hypothesis
2 prediction, but they vary in statistical significance.
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# PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS viewed; (b) Impact of Cognitive Reflection on # PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS 
viewed. Notes: Effect shown for models (3) and (7) in Table 6, which included control variables and 
used the subset of participants who complied with their prescribed sleep assignment from the larger 
sleep study. Negatively sloped forecast lines are consistent with the confirmation bias, but the steeper 
profile of the WR (upper panel) and CRT = 5 (lower panel) forecast lines indicate a more severe 
confirmation bias. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study extended previous findings showing that deliberation promotes a stronger 
confirmation bias. Participants who had thought more about gun control were found to have a more 
precisely estimated confirmation bias regarding selective information exposure and also a stronger 
magnitude of effect regarding perceived argument strength (Figure 1). Extending previous results, 
we showed these main confirmation bias findings to be present in both male and female participants 
when conditioning on the participant having thought relatively a lot about the issue of gun control, 
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marginal support for the hypothesis that selective information exposure is stronger for those well-
rested compared to sleep restricted. 
Of course, this study is not without limitations. Our college student sample was young (mean 
Age 19.82 ± 2.90), somewhat liberal (mean Liberal Score value 3.27 ± 0.97), and perhaps more naïve to 
the political process. For example, 21% indicated they were not yet registered to vote, and many likely 
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Figure 2. WR and cognitive reflection promote the confirmation bias. (a) Impact of Sleep Treatment
on # PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS viewed; (b) Impact of Cognitive Reflection on # PRO-GUN-RIGHTS
CLIPS viewed. Notes: Effect shown for models (3) and (7) in Table 6, which included control variables
and used the subset of participants who complied with their prescribed sleep assignment from the
larger sleep study. Negatively sloped forecast lines are consistent with the confirmation bias, but the
steeper profile of the WR (upper panel) and CRT = 5 (lower panel) forecast lines indicate a more severe
confirmation bias.
study extende previous findings showing that deliberation promotes a stronger confirmation
bias. Participants who had thought more about gun control were found to have a more precisely
estimated confirmation b as regarding selective information exposure a d also a stro ger magnitude of
effect regarding p rceived argum nt str ngth (Figure 1). Ex ending previous results, we sh wed these
main confirmation bias findings to be prese t in both male and female particip ts when cond t oning
on the participant having thought relatively a lot abou the issue of gun c ntrol, with males showing a
somewhat tronger confirmation bia along the dimension of perceived argument stre gth compar
to fe ales (Figure 1). As th se confirmation bias findings may ot hold for p rticipa t who have not
though a lot about the issue we examined (gun control), this is an indication of the importance of
ssue-specific deliberation on this bias. We also examined the hypothesis that more gener l measures
of c gnitive thinking styl may impact this bias. Cons ste t with previous findings, we fou d ha
individuals higher a validated measure of cognitive reflection showed evidence of a stronger
confirmation bias. Howev r, the CRT score effect was only identifi d along the inf mation exposure
dimension and not the perceived argument strength dimension. Finally, using our unique sample
of sl ep-manipulated participants, we reported marginal support for the hypothesis that s lective
information exposure is stronger for those well-rested co pared to sleep re tricted.
Of course, this study is not without limitations. Our college student sample was young (mean Age
19.82 ± 2.90), somewhat liberal (mean Liberal Score value 3.27 ± 0.97), and perhaps m re naïve to
the political process. For example, 21% indicated th y were not yet registered to vote, and many
likely had not yet voted. The trade-off this study was our access to a unique sample of individuals
randoml assigned to 5–7 consecutive night sleep level, and the SR co dition is similar to the sleep
level commonly experienced by nearly 1/3 of U.S. adults [30]. Though sleep restrict on o deprivation
is well-know to impact attention and deliberation, we do not find evidence tha the Hypothesis 2
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result regarding SR participants is due simply to increased random choice.15 Additionally, our results
regarding the SR impact on the confirmation bias were somewhat sensitive the sample restriction and
specification estimated. As such, it is clear that additional research is warranted to further examine
how sleepiness may impact the confirmation bias, to explore the dose-response of this or other decision
biases to a wider range of poor sleep measures, and to identify key effects in a more representative
sample of participants.
Our goal was to stimulate interest in new directions and test novel predictions of the confirmation
bias phenomenon, because the existing evidence suggests it is unlike other biases that are presumed to
result from the lack of attention of deliberation. If the confirmation bias is a product of deliberative
efforts to avoid regret and reduce cognitive dissonance, then this is a rare decision bias that may be less
prevalent when deliberation is reduced or bounds to rationality introduced. Results reported here
suggest this is likely the case, which may help further our understanding of the important confluence
of the confirmation bias, political polarization, and how deliberation may likely be a contributing factor.
Clearly, there is both a need and space for additional research in this area.
Funding: This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant SES-1734137 and the APC
was funded by this same grant.
Acknowledgments: The author also thanks John Holbein for helpful feedback in the initial survey design.
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Figure A2. Impact of Liberal Score ∈ (1, 5) on Thermometer ratings. Notes: Model with controls 
includes controls for age, gender, minority status, Epworth (daytime) sleepiness score, morningness-
eveningness preference (rMEQ), SR assignment, prosociality, backwards induction skill, and 
cognitive reflection score. One or more control measures not captured on 4 individuals (reducing 
sample by 4 observations when including controls).  Model conditioned on sleep compliance does 
not include WR participants with < 405 min nightly sleep (actigraphy measured) or SR participants 
with > 375 min nightly sleep. This model also excludes participants who failed the attention check 
Figure A1. Balance Tests. Notes: Observations = 197. Point estimates represent coefficient estimates,
β, on simple regression of variable listed on indicator variable for treatment assignment (SR = 0 or 1):
Characteristic = α+ β(SR) + ε.Thin (thick) lines around point estimates represent the 95% (90%) confidence
intervals. Measures assessed in these tests were derived from the recruitment database information.
15 Specifically, an examination of other outcomes by sleep condition do not support increased random choice. If one examines
the Liberal Score impact on favorability ratings shown in Appendix A Figure A2, and compares the Liberal Score impact of
SR versus WR participants on partisan personalities like Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton (or, on wealthy individuals
versus those on welfare), we find no significant different in the partisan effect on favorability ratings by SR assignment
(results available on request). A more random response pattern from SR individuals would not be predicted to produce a
systematic pattern such as this. Castillo et al. [31] examined how sleepiness impacted risky choice and documented that the
increased preference for risk in their sleepier participant was not due to increased randomness in choice.
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Figure A2. Impact of Liberal Score ∈ (1, 5) on Thermometer ratings. Notes: Model with controls includes
controls for age, gender, minority status, Epworth (daytime) sleepiness score, morningness-eveningness
preference (rMEQ), SR assignment, prosociality, backwards induction skill, and cognitive reflection
score. One or more control measures not captured on 4 individuals (reducing sample by 4 observations
when i cluding controls). Model conditioned on s eep compliance does not include WR participants
with < 405 min nightly sleep (actigraphy measured) or SR participants with > 375 min ightly sleep.
This model also excludes participants who failed the attention check (poison pill) question within
the survey. Thin (thick) lines around point estimates represent the 95% (90%) confidence intervals.
Full estimation results available on request.
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Figure A3. Impact of Liberal Score ∈ (1, 5) on Response Times (RT). (RT averaged across all Pro-Gun or
Anti-Gun info clips views or arguments assessed). Notes: Models included full set of control variables
(age, gender, minority status, Epworth (daytime) sleepiness score, morningness-eveningness preference
(rMEQ), SR assignment, prosociality, backwards induction skill, and cognitive reflection score), as well as
the inverse probability weight correction for sample selection (based the selection model estimates in
Appendix A Table A1). Thin (thick) lines around point estimat s r present the 95% (90%) confidence
intervals. Full estimation results available on request.
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Figure A4. Examining Thought Much direction as a regressor (with Liberal Score interaction). Notes:
Simple models restricted analysis to SR compliant participants and accounted for sample selection using
the IPW correction. These simple models included only the regressors whose coefficient estimates are
shown above. “Controls” models additionally included full set of control variables (age, gender (for the
“All” sample), minority status, Epworth (daytime) sleepiness score, morningness-eveningness preference
(rMEQ), SR assignment, prosociality, backwards induction skill, and cognitive reflection score.)
Thin (thick) lines around point estimates represent the 95% (90%) confidence intervals. Full estimation
results available on request.
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Table A1. Selection Equation Probit model.
Probit Estimation Variable Dep Var = Participated in Online Experiment (=1) (Conditional onRecruited into Sleep Study) Coefficient (SE)
SR (=1) −0.260 (0.162)
Female (=1) 0.156 (0.172)
Minority (=1) 0.190 (0.209)
Age −0.035 (0.027)
Optimal Sleep −0.033 (0.082)
Anxiety Risk −0.019 (0.033)
Depression Risk 0.060 (0.111)





Notes: Full recruited sample of n = 280 participants, with n = 197 participating in the confirmation bias task
(attrition due to study drop-out as well as those who completed the sleep study but chose not to participant in the
optional online survey). * p <0.10 for the 2-tailed test. Model estimates used to determine individual probabilities
of sample inclusion. The inverse of these probabilities are then used as the weights (inverse probability weights,
or IPW) to account selection correction in the confirmation bias analysis.
















Constant 19.449 (2.543) *** 13.695 (7.623) * 12.064 (8.203) 12.904 (8.649)
Liberal Score −8.054 (0.745) *** −6.938 (0.765) *** −6.762 (0.848) *** −6.948 (0.838) ***
Age — 0.316 (.277() 0.382 (0.291) 0.316 (0.282)
Female — −5.704 (1.536) *** −5.034 (1.665) *** −4.806 (1.722) ***
Minority — −3.191 (1.724) * −3.804 (1.841) ** −3.828 (1.625) **
Epworth — 0.074 (0.204) 0.003 (0.217) −0.006 (0.201)
rMEQ — 0.092 (0.232) 0.090 (0.255) −0.007 (0.299)
SR — −0.643 (1.397) −0.858 (1.515) −0.803 (1.598)
Pro-Social — −2.329 (1.649 −2.030 (1.748) −2.214 (2.022)
Race Wins — 0.272 (0.321) 0.289 (0.353) 0.373 (0.326)
CRT score — −0.389 (0.431) −0.423 (0.465) −0.385 (0.448)
Obs 197 193 172 172
R-squared 0.375 0.458 0.422 0.434
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for the 2-tailed test. Asterisks on Liberal Score coefficient estimates are
1-tailed tests given ex ante hypothesis that more liberal ideology would have less pro-gun-rights views. — indicates
covariates omitted for that specification. The inverse probability weight (IPW) correction in model (4) uses probability
estimates from the selection equation (see Appendix A Table A1) to weight observations based on the inverse of
their likelihood of being in our sample (conditional on the participant having been recruited into the sleep study).
Appendix B
(note: survey was offered as an online experiment to participants in a “sleep and decision
making” study who had already gone through at least 5 of the 7 treatment nights assigned (WR or SR).
Compensation for this survey was separate from compensation in the main sleep and decision study.)
Demographics measured: Parental income, mother’s education level (other demographics not
elicited but were known given participation in the main sleep and decision study).
Liberal Scale measure (continuous measure used for regression-based hypotheses tests).
Question: In terms of politics, do you consider yourself conservative, liberal, or middle-of-the-road?
(response options: 1 = Very conservative, 2 = Conservative, 3 = Middle-of-the-road, 4 = Liberal,
5 = Very Liberal)
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HIGH THOUGHT Measure
Question: People have told us they have thought a lot about some issues and haven’t thought at
all about some other issues. How would you rate the amount of thinking you have done about the
issue of gun control?
(slider bar [0, 100] scale with 0 = “Less thinking on this issue” and 100 = “more thinking on this issue”)
Thermometer Ratings:
Question: We’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people/groups
who are in the news these days. I’ll read the name of a person or group and I’d like you to rate that
person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees
mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees
mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the person and that you don’t care too much for that person.
You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward
the person.
Listing of individuals/groups: Donald Trump, Hilary Clinton, Conservatives, Liberals, Gay men and
lesbians (i.e., homosexuals), Illegal Immigrants, Muslims, Christian Fundamentalists, Rich People,
Middle Class People, Poor People, People on Welfare.
(slider bar [0, 100] scale for each with 0 = “Not favorable/cold feelings (I don’t care much for this
person or these people)” and 100 = “Favorable/warm feelings towards this person or these people”)
Politics—Attitudes and Extremity of Position (measured pre- and post main tasks).
Politics—Attitudes
Question: How much do you personally care about the issue of gun control?
Question: Compared to how you feel about other public issues, how strong are your feelings
regarding the issue of gun control?
Question: Some people report that they are very certain of their feelings on the issue of gun control.
Others say they are not certain at all. How certain are you of your feelings on the issue of gun control?
Question: People have told us they have thought a lot about some issues and haven’t thought at all
about some other issues. How would you rate the amount of thinking you have done about the issue
of gun control?
(for each, response is by slider bar [0, 100] scale with 0 representing the lowest values and 100
representing the highest value on the scale for that response metric)
Politics—Extremity of Position (responses to 6 statements combined using positive and reverse
scoring to create a singular metric ∈ [−24, +24] with positive scores indicating a pro-gun-rights
bias in one’s position). This measure is assessed before and after main tasks, with pre-measure
used as one’s pro-Gun-Rights score in the Appendix A Table A2 analysis where it is referred to as
Pro-Gun-Rights position)
Statement: Curbing gun violence is very important, but limiting the right to bear arms is not really
an effective way to do this.
Statement: Everyone’s rights and freedoms are important, but sometimes, as with gun control, it is
necessary to limit freedom for the greater public good.
Statement: Guns, like cars, should only be used by responsible citizens. Gun control laws just
insure that responsible people are using guns in a responsible manner.
Statement: Over the past few years our right to bear arms has been eroding. This encroachment on
our rights must be stopped.
Statement There should be no limits on the number of guns someone can own.
Statement: It is not the government’s job to pick and choose the types of weapons it finds acceptable
for citizens to own.
(for each individual item, response ∈ [−4, +4] indicates strength of agreement or disagreement
with the statement)
********************************************************************************************************************
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MAIN TASKS
Information Board—POLITICS
(Respondent selects the source of each of the six arguments, which were used to create the
# PRO-GUN-RIGHTS CLIPS variable. Sources used for information board arguments were: Republican
Party, National Rifle Association, Democratic Party, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence)
On the first task page, participants were asked:
From which source would you like to read the 1st argument on the issue of gun control?
# Republican Party
# National Rifle Association
# Democratic Party
# the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence
Following the participant’s selection, the corresponding clip (1–6) from the argument library
below was then shown on a new page. Then the participant was shown a new page where asked
“From which source would you like to read the 2nd argument on the issue of gun control?”, which was
followed by the same set of options. This process repeated until choices were made for each of the
6 self-chosen arguments (clips) in this task. For example, if “Democratic Party” was chosen as the
source for the 4th argument, then the 4th of the 6 arguments in the Democratic Party arguments
library (below) was shown to the participant.
Republican Party Arguments Library:
Lawful gun ownership enables Americans to exercise their God-given right of self-defense for the
safety of their homes, their loved ones, and their communities.
A smaller government with less regulation is the most efficient means to run a country. The same
holds true with gun rights: more interference by the government will lead to more gun deaths, not less.
Gun ownership is responsible citizenship, enabling Americans to defend their homes
and communities.
Frivolous lawsuits against gun manufacturers are harmful to the safety of the American people.
It’s wrong to impose federal licensing or registration of law-abiding gun owners.
Increasing access to hunting clinics and safety programs for children and adults will improve
gun safety.
Democratic Party Arguments Library:
In order to make our communities safer, we should expand and strengthen background checks
and close dangerous loopholes in our current gun laws.
It is immoral and wrong to provide gun makers and sellers with legal immunity protections.
In order to make our communities safer, we should ban assault weapons and large capacity
ammunition magazines. We must get these off our streets.
In order to reduce gun violence, we should focus on effective enforcement of existing laws,
especially strengthening our background check system.
In order to reduce gun violence, we can work together to enact commonsense improvements—like
reinstating the assault weapons ban and closing the gun show loophole—so that guns do not fall into
the hands of those irresponsible, law-breaking few.
The right to own firearms is subject to reasonable regulation, but what works in Chicago may not
work in Cheyenne.
National Rifle Association Arguments Library:
We (the NRA) oppose legislation to ban gun accessories, like bump stocks. Bills that propose
doing so are intentionally violating our Constitutional right to bear arms.
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Background check systems are ineffective because they don’t stop criminals from getting firearms.
After all, people who commit firearm crimes usually get their firearms through theft, the black market,
or family members or friends.
Assault weapons bans are completely ineffective. They violate our Constitutional right to defend
ourselves, our families and our communities.
The NRA opposes expansion of the background check system, because criminals easily get guns
by other means and because expanding the background check requirement would be a step toward
transforming the background check system into a national gun registry.
Self-defense is a fundamental right, and the right to use firearms for self-defense is recognized by
the Constitution of the United States.
The NRA does not want terrorists or dangerous people to have firearms. The NRA’s only objective
is to ensure that Americans who are wrongly on the terrorist watch list are afforded their constitutional
right to due process.
The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence arguments library:
Many children and teens live in homes with firearms, including ones that are loaded and unlocked.
This endangers the most vulnerable members of our communities.
Congress should renew the assault weapons ban. Until they do so, we are at risk for more tragic
mass shootings.
The decisions by bad actors in the gun industry to engage in reckless and dangerous practices is
one of the primary drivers of gun violence in America.
The evidence is clear: background checks work. They keep our communities safer and protect us
from having guns fall into the hands of those who would seek to harm our children and our communities.
Experts estimate that 1 out of 5 gun sales occur in “no questions asked” transactions that often
take place over the Internet or at gun shows where, in most states, background checks are not required.
This dangerous loophole puts thousands and thousands of guns in the hands of dangerous people like
domestic abusers, felons and the dangerously mentally ill.
Gun accessories, like bump stocks, that convert semiautomatic weapons into the functional
equivalent of machine guns are dangerous and irresponsible. Congress should act to ban these devices.
*******************************************************************************************************************
Argument Strength—POLITICS
(for each individual item, a response ∈ [−4, +4] indicates how “incredibly weak” (−4) to how
“incredibly strong” (+4) one finds the argument, and each argument is presented on its own
separate page in the survey. Responses on all 6 arguments are combined using positive and
reverse scoring to create a singular metric PRO-GUN-RIGHTS ARGUMENT STRENGTH ∈ [−24, +24]
with positive scores indicating pro-gun-rights arguments were found relatively more strong than
pro-gun-control arguments.)
BASIC INSTRUCTIONS: In this section, you are asked to read a set of arguments on gun control
and tell us how WEAK or STRONG you believe each argument is. These arguments may be useful
if you need to explain the gun control debate to someone. Please note: We want to know how WEAK
or STRONG you believe the argument is, NOT WHETHER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH
THE ARGUMENT. Please try to leave your feelings about gun control aside and indicate how strong
or weak you feel the argument is. Please be as objective as possible.
REMEMBER: whether you agree or disagree with the conclusion of an argument is not the same
thing as whether you think the argument is weak or strong.
The next page presents the first argument for you to rate. Please read each argument careful
before giving your rating.
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Argument #1: Self-defense arguments for the need of guns are silly: guns only become necessary for
self-defense because there are so many guns out there. Thus, guns should be outlawed outright–then
we won’t need to worry about self-defense
Argument #2: The liberal media distorts gun issues: they only talk about tragedies involving
guns. Yet guns were used defensively 2.5 million times last year. The real tragedy would be to outlaw
guns–crime would spiral out of control.
Argument #3: Recent trials against gun manufacturers have consistently found them guilty, and
have forced the gun industry to pay out huge sums of money. If the courts can find good reason to rein
in the gun industry, then it is high time for Congress to follow suit.
Argument #4: Most privately-owned guns in America are owned by sportsmen and are used for
completely peaceful purposes. These guns pose no risk to society, but they are unfairly targeted by
gun control legislation.
Argument #5: The United States has the highest murder rate of all industrialized nations. It is also
the only industrialized country that has lenient gun laws. We therefore say: bring down the number of
guns, bring down the murder rate.
Argument #6: Gun control legislation can only regulate guns sold through legal outlets. But these
days, many criminals buy their guns illegally. Gun control legislation therefore cannot regulate the
most dangerous guns in society.
*******************************************************************************************************************
Self Report Sleep Measures (Ask Prior to the Political Confirmation Bias Task Questions)
Question: Please mark the number that best corresponds to how sleep you feel right now. You may
mark any number, but mark only one number.
(Response options range from 1 = “Extremely alert” to 9 = “Extremely sleepy—fighting sleep”.
This is the Karolinska sleepiness measure: Åkerstedt and Gillberg, 1990 [24])
Question: Over the last 7 nights, what is the average amount of sleep you obtained each night?
(slider bar response between 0 and 12 h/night, with partial hours allowed)
References
1. Allcott, H.; Gentzkow, M. Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. J. Econ. Perspect. 2017, 31, 211–236.
[CrossRef]
2. Bakshy, E.; Messing, S.; Adamic, L.A. Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook.
Science 2015, 348, 1130–1132. [CrossRef]
3. Hart, W.; Albarracín, D.; Eagly, A.H.; Brechan, I.; Lindberg, M.J.; Merrill, L. Feeling validated versus being
correct: A meta-analysis of selective exposure to information. Psychol. Bull. 2009, 135, 555–588. [CrossRef]
4. Knobloch-Westerwick, S.; Mothes, C.; Polavin, N. Confirmation Bias, Ingroup Bias, and Negativity Bias in
Selective Exposure to Political Information. Commun. Res. 2017, 47, 104–124. [CrossRef]
5. Lord, C.G.; Ross, L.; Lepper, M.R. Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories
on subsequently considered evidence. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 1979, 37, 2098. [CrossRef]
6. Taber, C.; Lodge, M. Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. Am. J. Politi Sci. 2006, 50,
755–769. [CrossRef]
7. Bail, C.A.; Argyle, L.P.; Brown, T.W.; Bumpus, J.P.; Chen, H.; Hunzaker, M.F.; Volfovsky, A. Exposure to
opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2018, 115,
9216–9221. [CrossRef]
8. Festinger, L. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance; Stanford University Press: San Francisco, CA, USA, 2017;
Volume 2.
9. Cotton, J.L. Cognitive dissonance in selective exposure. In Selective Exposure to Communication; Routledge:
London, UK, 1985; pp. 11–33.
10. Frey, D. Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology;
Berkowitz, L., Ed.; Academic Press: New York, NY, USA, 1986; pp. 41–80.
Games 2020, 11, 57 25 of 25
11. Frimer, J.A.; Skitka, L.J.; Motyl, M. Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid exposure to
one another’s opinions. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2017, 72, 1–12. [CrossRef]
12. Charpentier, C.J.; Bromberg-Martin, E.S.; Sharot, T. Valuation of knowledge and ignorance in mesolimbic
reward circuitry. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2018, 115, E7255–E7264. [CrossRef]
13. Kobayashi, K.; Hsu, M. Common neural code for reward and information value. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
2019, 116, 13061–13066. [CrossRef]
14. Nicolle, A.; Fleming, S.M.; Bach, D.R.; Driver, J.; Dolan, R.J. A regret-induced status quo bias. J. Neurosci.
2011, 31, 3320–3327. [CrossRef]
15. Jones, M.; Sugden, R. Positive confirmation bias in the acquisition of information. Theory Decis. 2001, 50,
59–99. [CrossRef]
16. Dickinson, D.L. Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias: An Examination of Politics and Religion; IZA
Discussion Paper 132421; Appalachian State University: Boone, NC, USA, 2020.
17. Hafner, M.; Stepanek, M.; Taylor, J.; Troxel, W.M.; Van Stolk, C. Why sleep matters—The economic costs of
insufficient sleep: A cross-country comparative analysis. Rand Health Q. 2017, 6, 11.
18. Dickinson, D.L.; McElroy, T. Bayesian versus heuristic-based choice under sleep restriction and suboptimal
times of day. Games Econ. Behav. 2019, 115, 48–59. [CrossRef]
19. Castillo, M.; Dickinson, D.L. Sleep Restriction Increases Coordination Failure; IZA Discussion Paper No. 13242;
Appalachian State University: Boone, NC, USA, 2020.
20. Kroenke, K.; Spitzer, R.L.; Williams, J.B. The Patient Health Questionnaire-2: Validity of a two-item depression
screener. Med. Care 2003, 41, 1284–1292. [CrossRef]
21. Spitzer, R.L.; Kroenke, K.; Williams, J.B.; Löwe, B. A brief measure for assessing generalized anxiety disorder:
The GAD-7. Arch. Intern. Med. 2006, 166, 1092–1097. [CrossRef]
22. Adan, A.; Almirall, H. Horne & Östberg morningness-eveningness questionnaire: A reduced scale. Pers. Individ.
Differ. 1991, 12, 241–253. [CrossRef]
23. Goldman, S.E.; Stone, K.L.; Ancoli-Israel, S.; Blackwell, T.; Ewing, S.K.; Boudreau, R.; Cauley, J.A.; Hall, M.;
Matth20ews, K.A.; Newman, A.B. Poor Sleep is Associated with Poorer Physical Performance and Greater
Functional Limitations in Older Women. Sleep 2007, 30, 1317–1324. [CrossRef]
24. Åkerstedt, T.; Gillberg, M. Subjective and Objective Sleepiness in the Active Individual. Int. J. Neurosci. 1990,
52, 29–37. [CrossRef]
25. Dickinson, D.L.; Drummond, S.P.A.; McElroy, T. The viability of an ecologically valid chronic sleep restriction
and circadian timing protocol: An examination of sample attrition, compliance, and effectiveness at impacting
sleepiness and mood. PLoS ONE 2017, 12, e0174367. [CrossRef]
26. Primi, C.; Morsanyi, K.; Chiesi, F.; Donati, M.A.; Hamilton, J. The Development and Testing of a New Version
of the Cognitive Reflection Test Applying Item Response Theory (IRT). J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 2016, 29, 453–469.
[CrossRef]
27. Johns, M.W. A New Method for Measuring Daytime Sleepiness: The Epworth Sleepiness Scale. Sleep 1991,
14, 540–545. [CrossRef]
28. Murphy, R.O.; Ackermann, K.A.; Handgraaf, M. Measuring Social Value Orientation. SSRN Electron. J. 2011,
6, 771–781. [CrossRef]
29. Gneezy, U.; Rustichini, A.; Vostroknutov, A. Experience and insight in the race game. J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
2010, 75, 144–155. [CrossRef]
30. Schoenborn, C.A.; Adams, P.E. Health behaviors of adults: United States, 2005–2007. Vital Health Stat. 2010,
245, 132.
31. Castillo, M.; Dickinson, D.L.; Petrie, R. Sleepiness, choice consistency, and risk preferences. Theory Decis.
2017, 82, 41–73. [CrossRef]
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional
affiliations.
© 2020 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
